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Firm Offers Under the UCC and the
CISG
Henry Mather
In the sale of goods context, offerors have usually not chosen
to make their offers irrevocable. In some situations, however, an
irrevocable or firm offer makes good sense. If the offeree would
have to spend substantial time and money investigating the
proposed deal, he will be unlikely to incur the expense of such an
investigation if the offer can be revoked at any moment; an
irrevocable offer makes him more willing to undertake the
investigation and thus enhances the likelihood of acceptance. If the
offeror has identified a particular person as her preferred trading
partner or the person most likely to accept her terms, a firm offer to
that person will flatter him with what appears to be a first option;
he will thus be more likely to consider the offer seriously and accept
it.
We can expect that in the future, firm offers to buy or sell
goods will become ever more frequent. There are at least two good
reasons for such an expectation. First, the increasing technological
complexity and product differentiation of the goods being sold will
more often require offerees to undertake costly investigations and
thus lead to a greater number of firm offers. Seconds trade in
goods becomes increasingly global, merchants will more often be
searching for trading partners in distant and unfamiliar markets. If
an Ohio merchant, for example, has little information about
potential trading partners in such a market, but has been able to
identify one company with a good reputation for competence and
dependability, the Ohio merchant will likely have a strong
preference for that company and send it a firm offer, rather than
incur the expenses of investigating other companies.
This article will examine the firm offer rules in the present
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), the proposed revision of
UCC Article 2, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). With respect to each
of these rules, we will seek answers to four questions: (1) Must the
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offer be in writing in order to be irrevocable? (2) What limits are
imposed on the period of irrevocability? (3) What kind of assur-
ance of irrevocability is required? (4) If the offer does not meet the
rule's formal requirements, might the offer nonetheless become
irrevocable due to the offeree's reliance? We will also evaluate the
firm offer rule in the proposed revision of UCC Article 2 and
consider the propriety of nonuniform enactments. Finally, we will
try to develop some standard terms that could be used in drafting
offers. Throughout this article, we will assume that both parties are
merchants.
I. The Present UCC Section 2-205
In the present UCC, the firm offer rule is found in section 2-
205. Before looking at this section, however, we should recall its
historical background.
A. Historical Background
In American contract law, the general rule has been that an
offer is revocable until it is accepted.1 Even if the offeror promises
not to revoke, this promise was traditionally regarded as legally
ineffective in the absence of consideration.2
American courts have long recognized that if the offeror
promises not to revoke the offer before a specified time and
receives consideration for this promise, an option contract is
formed and the offer is irrevocable until the specified time.3
Although such option contracts have often been used as preludes to
contracts for the sale of real estate, buyers and sellers of goods have
usually not been willing to take the extra step of forming an option
contract before forming a contract for the sale of goods.
Under the Restatement (First) of Contracts, an offer for a
unilateral contract becomes irrevocable when the offeree began the
requested performance.4 This rule applied only if the offer clearly
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 35(1) (1932) (stating that
an offer may be terminated by the offeror's revocation, except as stated in §§ 45-
47); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.17, at 158 (3d ed. 1999).
2. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 2.25(b), at 113 (4th ed. 1998); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.23, at
180.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 46 (1932); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 1, § 3.23, at 180-82. In this article, the term "option contract" refers to
the contract formed when consideration is exchanged for a promise not to revoke
an offer.
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45, § 45 cmts. a, b (1932).
[Vol. 105:1
FIRM OFFERS UNDER THE UCC AND THE CISG
invited acceptance by performance and not by return promise In
the sale of goods context, offers seldom indicate unequivocally that
acceptance can be made only by performance; thus, the Restatement
(First) part performance rule was seldom available. Even when it
was applicable it made the offer irrevocable only when the offeree
actually began performance or tendered a beginning of
performance, as opposed to merely preparing to perform.6
The Restatement (First) of Contracts also contained a
promissory estoppel doctrine stating that the promisee's reliance on
a promise could make the promise enforceable despite the lack of
consideration Could an offeror's promise not to revoke his offer
be enforced under this doctrine? Section 35 provided that an offer
could be terminated by the offeror's revocation, except as stated in
sections 45 through 47;8 the promissory estoppel doctrine was
contained in section 90, however.9 Further doubts about the
usefulness of promissory estoppel as a device to make offers
irrevocable were raised when James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,
Inc.1" was decided in 1933, one year after the publication of the
Restatement (First). In Baird, the court held that the section 90
promissory estoppel doctrine could not be applied to an offer for a
commercial exchange if the offer lacked a promise not to revoke.'
The court left open the question of whether a promise not to
revoke could be enforced by way of promissory estoppel, but hinted
that its answer would be in the negative. 2
In the 1940s and 1950s, however, a number of American courts
suggested that the offeree's reliance on an offer could make the
offer irrevocable under the promissory estoppel doctrine, but did
not make it clear whether there had to be an express promise not to
revoke. 3 This issue was given a rather innovative resolution in the
5. See id § 45, § 45 cmt. c, § 31.
6. See id § 45 cmt. a.
7. See id § 90.
8. See id § 35(l).
9. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACrS § 90.
10. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1993) (involving subcontractor's offer to sell linoleum
to a potential general contractor).
11. See id. at 346.
12. See id (noting that although promissory estoppel might apply, the decisions
are otherwise).
13. See Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir.
1941) (dictum) (rejecting Baird and indicating that the fact that a transaction
would be a commercial sale of goods would not preclude the use of promissory
estoppel); Kucera v. Kavan, 84 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Neb. 1957) (dictum) (indicating
that an option contract offer to sell an interest in land would also be irrevocable
under section 90 of the Restatement (First); Northwestern Eng'g Co. v. Ellerman,
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landmark case, Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,4 decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1958. In Drennan the court held that
even if there was no explicit promise not to revoke, the
foreseeability of the offeree's reliance on an offer created an
implied promise by the offeror not to revoke: If this implied
promise lacked consideration, it could be enforced under the
promissory estoppel doctrine, and the offer could thus be rendered
irrevocable.15
The Drennan court indicated, however, that the offeree's
reliance on an offer make the offer irrevocable only if that reliance
was detrimental to the offeree, foreseeable to the offeror, and
reasonable on the part of the offeree. 6 These requirements are
easily met when, as in Drennan, the offeror is a subcontractor who
anticipates that his offer might be relied upon by the offeree
general contractor when she makes her own bid to the owner of the
construction site. In many sale of goods cases, however, it would be
very difficult for the offeree to prove that these requirements were
satisfied. Promissory estoppel has therefore had somewhat limited
usefulness in the sale of goods context.
As this brief historical survey indicates, any legal rule making
offers irrevocable when they lack both consideration and
detrimental reliance would be a radical departure from traditional
American contact law. The UCC provided just such a rule for sales
of goods.
B. The Firm Offer Rule
The 1962 Official Text of the UCC, enacted as statutory law in
most states, includes a firm offer rule in section 2-205.
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not
revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if
no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such
period of irrevocability exceed thee months; but any such term
10 N.W.2d 879, 884 (S.D. 1943) (rejecting Baird reasoning and holding that a
subcontractor's offer to construct a sewer system was irrevocable under section 90
the offeror did not explicitly promise not to revoke).
14. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (involving subcontractor's bid offer to do paving
work for a general contractor).
15. See id. at 760.
16. See id. at 760.
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of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be
17
separately signed by the offeror.
C. Must the Offer Be in Writing?
Section 2-205 explicitly requires that the offer be in writing. 8
Furthermore, the written offer must be signed. 9 The official
comments indicate that although section 2-205 was intended to
modify the traditional rule requiring consideration, the purpose was
to give effect to only deliberate intentions to make an irrevocable
offer, hence the requirement, of a signed writing.'
D. What Limits Are Imposed on the Period of Irrevocability?
Section 2-205 imposes an outside limit of three months on the
period of irrevocability. Thus, if an offer stated that it would be
irrevocable for six months, section 2-205 would make it irrevocable
for only three months.2' To make such an offer irrevocable for six
months the offeree would have to furnish consideration for the
offer. Of course, if an offer states that it will be irrevocable for
two weeks the period of irrevocability will last only two weeks.
E. What Kind of Assurance of Irrevocability Is Required?
Section 2-205 requires that the written offer give an "assurance
that it will be held open." This probably means that the offer must
contain a written assurance (a promise) not to revoke. But what of
language is sufficient? I am unable to find any judicial decision that
provides helpful guidance here.
17. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2000). The term "merchant" is defined in id. § 2-104(1).
In applying section 2.205, we should regard as a merchant any person acting within
the scope of her business. See id. § 2-104 cmt. 2.
18. The term "writing" is defined in id. § 1-201(46).
19. The term "signed" is defined in id. § 1-201(39) and further explained in §
1-201 cmt. 39.
20. See id. § 2-205 cmts. 1-2.
21. When does the three-month period of irrevocability begin to run? When
the offer is sent or when it is received? Presumably, when it is received. American
case law generally regards an offer as not becoming effective until it is received by
the offeree. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.10, at 134 (3d ed.
1999). Until an offer has become effective, it can be "withdrawn" but cannot be
"revoked." For the distinction between withdrawal and revocation, see id. § 3.17,
at 157.
22. If the promise not to revoke is supported by consideration, the period of
irrevocability may continue for as long as the parties specify; the section 2-205 rule




Language stating that "this offer will expire on June 1" would
usually not suffice. It would normally be interpreted as merely
establishing an expiration date for the offer, rather than a promise
not to revoke. What about language stating that "this offer will be
open until June 1"? This might be interpreted as an assurance that
the offer will remain available for acceptance until June 1 (will not
be revoked before June 1), but it might also be interpreted as
merely stating that the offer will not expire until June 1. Language
stating that "this offer will be good until June 1" is equally
ambiguous. What if the offer states that it "will be held open until
June 1"? Most offerees could reasonably interpret this as an
assurance by the offeror that he will not revoke before June 1. The
phrase "will be held open" suggests that during the stated period,
the offeror will not take positive action to kill the offer, which is not
the same thing as merely watching the offer expire. Finally,
language stating that "we assure you that we will not revoke this
offer before June 1" should certainly suffice.
White and Summers suggest that the following language would
satisfy the section 2-205 "assurance" requirement: "This offer is
firm and will remain open for three months., 23 What indicates a
promise not to revoke is not the phrase "will remain open for three
months" (which is ambiguous), but the word "firm," which is
usually interpreted to mean irrevocable. We should exercise
caution, however, before concluding that any given word or phrase
will always (or never) satisfy the section 2-205 requirement. A
word or phrase may mean one thing in one trade and something
else in another trade.
All we can say is that our courts can be expected to interpret
the language of the offer as an "assurance" under section 2-205 if
the offeree could have reasonable interpreted the language as a
promise not to revoke. In dealing with problems of contract
formation and mutual assent, most American courts take an
objective approach, interpreting one party's words as they would
reasonably be interpreted by the other party.24 We can thus expect
23. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
1-4, at 49 (5th ed. 2000) (student hornbook edition); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-4, at 33 (4th ed 1995) (practitioners'
edition).
24. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, § 3.6 , at 116-18 (discussing
subjective and objective theories of assent), § 3.10, at 132-34 (discussing which
communications are offers), § 3.17, at 159 (discussing what counts as a revocation).
Unless it is somehow inconsistent with the UCC rules, case law espousing the
objective approach to interpretation can be applied by the court. See U.C.C. § 1-
103 (2000).
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a court to consider all of the offeree's circumstances (including
usages of trade and any prior course of dealing with the offeror)
that shed light on how the offeree could have reasonably
interpreted the language in the offer.
F. If the Offer Does Not Meet the Requirements of Section 2-205,
Might It Become Irrevocable Because of the Offeree's Reliance?
An offer might contain some indication that it is irrevocable
and yet not meet the requirements of section 2-205. It might not be
in writing. It might be written but not signed. It might not contain
an adequate "assurance" of irrevocability. Does section 2-205
permit a finding that such an offer is nonetheless irrevocable
because of the offeree's reliance? Or does section 2-205 displace
any case law applying promissory estoppel, so that such case law
cannot be used via section 1-103?21
The last sentence of comment 2 to section 2-205 states that
when oral offers are relied upon they "remain revocable under this
Article since authentication by a writing is the essence of this
section. 26 Does this merely mean that oral offers cannot be made
irrevocable by section 2-205, or does it mean that compliance with
25. A case law doctrine does not supplement the UCC provisions if it has been
"displaced" by a particular UCC provision. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2000). The official
comments to section 1-103 use the phrase "explicitly displaced." See id. § 1-103
cmt. 1.
If the offer is not written and signed, the offeree who tries to use promissory
estoppel to enforce a promise not to revoke is also likely to have a problem under
the statute of frauds in section 2-201. Subsection (1) states that "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of
$500 or more is not enforceable. .. unless there is some writing.., signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought." U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1999). This rather
clearly indicates that the exceptions in subsections (2) and (3) are the only
exceptions. The exceptions in subsection (3) cover some acts of reliance, but only
when those acts involve part performance or preparations for performance. See id.
§ 2-201(3)(a), (c).
Nevertheless, a court might hold that the statute of frauds is not a defense to a
promissory estoppel claim. One court, for example, reasoned that the section 2-
201 statute of frauds applies only to contractual claims, and a promissory estoppel
claim is a noncontractual claim. See Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
386 F. Supp. 687, 697 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (applying Wisconsin law), affd, 527 F.2d
772 (7th Cir. 1976).
Other courts, however, hold that promissory estoppel cannot be used to avoid
the statute of frauds, see, e.g., Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem
Maintenance, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 543, 552-54 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (applying Mississippi
law), or that promissory estoppel can overcome the statute of frauds only when the
promisor had promised to produce a writing, see, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. W.M.K.
Transit Mix, Inc., 493 P.2d 1220, 1225-26 (Ariz. App. 1972).
26. U.C.C. § 2-205 cmt. 2 (2000).
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section 2-205 is the only way to render irrevocable an offer lacking
consideration in a transaction governed by Article 2? The quoted
words "under this Article" seem to suggest the latter interpretation.
But in most states, the official comments are not enacted as
statutory law and remain merely persuasive authority. A court
could thus reject the last sentence in comment 2, if it could not
interpret that sentence to be consistent with case law approving
promissory estoppel as a device to make offers irrevocable.
Certain cases are often cited as authority for the proposition
that section 2-205 does not preclude the application of promissory
estoppel. Some of these decisions involved (or may have involved)
sale of goods transactions and approved the use of promissory
estoppel. But none of them expressly held that an offer not
complying with section 2-205 can be made irrevocable under
promissory estoppel theory.
E.A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Construction Co.27
involved a subcontractor's bid to supply and erect structural steel. 8
Although the appellate court remanded the case for a determin-
ation of whether the elements of a promissory estoppel were
present,29 it did not decide whether the bid was an offer3°and did not
decide whether the transaction was governed by UCC Article 2.31
The court noted that the bid did not contain anything resembling
the assurance required by section 2-20532 but expressly declined to
decide whether section 2-205 precludes promissory estoppel.33
Janke Construction Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.34 involved an
oral price quotation for the sale of concrete pipes to a general
contractor.35 The federal district court noted that the price
quotation did not comply with UCC section 2-205,36 but enforced
the supplier's price quotation under the Wisconsin promissory
estoppel doctrine.37 We might see here an implicit holding that
section 2-205 does not preclude promissory estoppel. But the court
did not indicate the promissory estoppel was being used to make an
27. 216 A.2d 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
28. See id. at 248, 249.
29. See id. at 252.
30. See id. at 249.
31. See id.
32. See E. A. Coronis Associates, 216 A.2d at 248, 249.
33. See id. at 253 n.2.
34. 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (applying Wisconsin law, affd, 527 F.2d
772 (7th Cir. 
1976).
35. See id. at 689.
36. See id. at 691-92.
37. See id. at 692-95.
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offer irrevocable. The court never characterized the price
quotation as an offer, and there does not appear to have been an
attempted revocation. So revocability was not an issue. This was
merely a case in which the court applied the Wisconsin promissory
estoppel doctrine, which enforced promises that did not even rise to
the level of a contractual offer.38
Jenkins & Boller Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, Inc.39 involved a
subcontractor's written bid for the sale and installation of various
metals." The appellate court cited a number of UCC Article 2
sections (including 2,205)1 and apparently assumes that the
transaction was governed by Article 2. The appellate court upheld
the trial court's application of promissory estoppel in awarding
judgment to the general contractor who relied on the bid.42 But it is
not clear that revocability was an issue (acceptance may have
preceded attempted revocation 43). The opinion never stated that an
offer that does not comply with section 2-205 may nevertheless
become irrevocable under promissory estoppel doctrine.
Two decisions involved offers to sell goods and declined to
apply promissory estoppel theory. But neither opinion expressly
states that promissory estoppel cannot be used to make irrevocable
an offer that does not comply with section 2-205.
In Tatsch v Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co.,' a supplier made a
telegraphic offer in 1963 to sell folding tables and benches to a
general contractor.45 The New Mexico court held that the offeree's
reliance on the offer could not constitute a promissory estoppel and
cited the Baird decision.' Although the UCC had been in effect in
New Mexico since 1962, the court did not cite section 2-205 or any
other UCC section and seems to have been unaware of section 2-
205. 7
Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maint., Inc.48
involved a manufacturer's price quotation, partly oral and partly
38. See id. at 692-93 (citing Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267
(Wis. 1965).
39. 344 N.E.2d 275 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
40. See id. at 276.
41. See id. at 277, 278-79.
42. See id. at 277, 278.
43. See id. at 277.
44. 418 P.2d 187 (N.M. 1966).
45. See id. at 188.
46. See id. at 189.
47. See id. at 190 (stating that an offer not under seal or given for a
consideration may be withdrawn at any time prior to acceptance).
48. 463 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (applying Mississippi law).
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written for the sale of air compressors.49 The court held that the
price quotation was at best a revocable offer, because it contained
no assurance that it would be held open, as required by UCC
section 2-205.5' The court did not expressly hold that section 2-205
precludes the application of promissory estoppel. But the court
held that under Mississippi law, promissory estoppel could not
overcome the UCC section 2-201 statute of frauds defense,51 so the
court was obviously aware of promissory estoppel theory when it
discussed section 2-205. Furthermore, the court stated in a footnote
that it rejected the contention that a seller's firm offer "may arise
by implication from the mere fact of the buyer's" detrimental
reliance. 2 It is not clear, however, whether the court merely meant
to state the truism that an express promise to hold an offer open
cannot be implied from offeree reliance (or the foreseeability of
such reliance), or meant, in addition, that promissory estoppel
cannot be used to enforce an express promise to hold an offer open
when the offer fails to satisfy one of the other section 2-205
requirements.
Although the scholarly commentators are not in agreement on
this promissory estoppel issue, they are at least clear in staking out
their positions. White and Summers suggest that when "section 2-
205 is not met, this should not be taken to prevent offerees from
invoking promissory estoppel or Restatement doctrine.53 Robert
Nordstrom states that section 2-205 should not be read to preclude
the application of promissory estoppel; he makes the interesting
argument that section 2-205 was not intended to deal with the
revocability "of offers from which consideration has been given or
for which a substitute for consideration is present., 54  Michael
Gibson argues that, on the contrary, Karl Llewellyn, the primary
drafter of UCC Article 2, was opposed to promissory estoppel
doctrine because of his desire for formal authentication of firm
offers, and that the courts have improperly used promissory
estoppel to bypass UCC sections such as 2-205."5
49. See id. at 545.
50. See id. at 551-52.
51. See id. at 552-54.
52. Id. at 551 n.4.
53. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
1-4, at 49 (5th ed. 200) (student hombook edition); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-4, at 33 (4th ed. 1995) (practitioners'
edition).
54. ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 33, at 86
(1970) (emphasis added).
55. See Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the U.CC.., and the
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II. CISG Article 16
The CISG is an international treaty ratified by the United
States and most of the other leading trading nations in the world,
with Japan and the United Kingdom being the most notable
exceptions. The CISG governs a sale of goods transaction between
a party located in the United States and a party having its place of
business in another country that has ratified the treaty.6 The CISG
does not normally apply, however, to goods bought by a consumer;
nor does it apply to sales of vessels or aircraft."
The treaty was drafted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").58 In drafting the article
dealing with the revocability of offers, UNCITRAL faces a serious
challenge: the various domestic legal systems of the world took
widely disparate approaches to revocability. A survey of English,
German, and French contract law illustrates this disparity.
A. Comparative Law Background
In English contract law, offers are generally revocable until
there is an effective acceptance. 9 Even if the offeror expressly
promises not to revoke during a specified time, this promise is not
enforceable unless it is supported by consideration or is under
seal.' English courts have been reluctant to use the promissory
estoppel doctrine often employed by American courts to make
Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 659, 661, 662, 701-03 (1988).
56. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, opened for signature April 11, 1980, art. 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9
(1980), 19 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter "CISG"]. If a party has places of business in
more than one country, the one that counts is the one that has the closest
relationship to the contract and its performance. See id. art. 10(a).
Article 1(1)(b) provides that the CISG also applies when the parties are
located in different countries and conflict of laws rules lead to the application of
the law of any country that has ratified the treaty. This provision is not United
States law, however, because the United States has declared, pursuant to article 95,
that it will not be bound by article 1(1)(b). See message from the President of the
United States Senate, Appendix IB, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1980).
57. See CISG art. 2(a), (e).
58. For a brief history of the drafting of the CISG and the 1980 Vienna
diplomatic conference at which it was approved, see JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM
LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
§§ 4-10 (3d ed. 1999).
59. See J. BEATSON, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 52 (27th ed. 1998); HEIN
KOTZ, 1 EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 22 (Tony Weir trans., 1997).
60. See BEATSON supra note 59, at 54-55; KOTZ, supra note 59, at 22; P.D.V.
MARSH, COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 58 (1994);
Iswar C. Saxena Report on English Law, in 1 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 766, 766
(Rudolf B. Schlessinger ed., 1968).
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subcontractors' offers irrevocable and thus allow accepting offerees
to recover the breach of contract." In England, the tendency has
been to use promissory estoppel only as a shield for defendants and
not as a sword enabling plaintiffs to establish causes of action."
With respect to the revocability of offers, German contract law
is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Offers are generally
irrevocable. If the offeror promises not to revoke during a specified
period, the offer cannot be effectively revoked during that period.63
If the offer states that it must be accepted within a specified period
and thus fixes an expiration date, it is irrevocable throughout that
period.' If the offer is silent as to both revocability and expiration,
it is irrevocable for a reasonable time (a reasonable time for a
response for the offeree).65 About the only way the "offeror" can
make the "offer" revocable is to expressly state that it is revocable,
using words such as freibleibend or ohne Obligo. In such a case, it is
likely to be treated as an invitation for an offer and not as a true
offer.66
The French approach to revocability lies somewhere between
the English approach and the German approach. Although offers
have generally been revocable under French law, there are a
number of situations in which the offeror has an obligation not to
revoke.67 These situations arise when
(1) the offeror expressly promises not to revoke during a
specified time,5
(2) the offer states that it must be accepted within a specified
time, 69 or
61. See BEATSON, supra note 59, at 55, 117; MARSH, supra note 60, at 58.
62. See BEATSON, supra note 59, at 117-18 (citing Combe v. Combe, 2 K.B. 215
(1951), and other cases).
63. See MARSH, supra note 60, at 63.
64. See Karl H Neumayer, Report on German and Swiss Law, in 1 FORMATION
OF CONTRACTS 780, 782 (Rudolf B. Schlesinger, ed., 1968) (citing § 148 BGB [the
German Civil Code]).
65. See KOTZ, supra note 59, at 23 (citing § 145 BGB); MARSH, supra note 60,
at 63; KONRAD SWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
361 (3d rev. ed. Tony Weir trans., 1998).
66. See KOTZ, supra note 59, at 23; MARSH, supra note 60, at 63; ZWEIGERT &
KOTZ, supra note 65, at 362; Neumayer, supra note 64, at 781 (citing § 145 BGB).
67. See MARSH, supra note 60, at 59; ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 65, at 359.
68. See Cass. Civ., Dec. 17, 1958, D. Jur. 1959, 33 (declaring that if the offeror
has expressly or implicitly undertaken not to revoke before a certain time, he
cannot revoke before that time without incurring liability); MARSH, supra note 60,
at 59, BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 64 (1982); Pierre Bonassies,
Report of French Law, in 1 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 769, 769-70 (Rudolf B.
Schlesinger ed., 1968).
69. See KOTZ, supra note 59, at 22-23; ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 65, at
359; Bonassies, supra note 68, at 772 n.17.
[Vol. 105:1
FIRM OFFERS UNDER THE UCC AND THE CISG
(3) circumstances or usage of trade require that the offeror hold
the offer open for a reasonable time (a dMai raisonnable)
before revoking.
7
The court decisions and commentators are not in agreement,
however, about the legal consequences of a premature revocation
that violates the obligation not to revoke.7 It has been suggested
that the premature revocation is ineffective and that the offeree's
acceptance will thus form a contract for breach of which the offeror
would be liable for expectation damages.72 The other and more
often expressed view is that he premature revocation effectively
precludes the formation of a contract but subjects the offeror to
delictual (tort) liability for the offeree's reliance loss.
73
The French approach obviously differs from the English
approach by imposing on offerors a legal obligation not to revoke
in many situations where there is no promise of irrevocability
supported by consideration. Unlike the German approach, how-
ever, the French approach does not clearly make a premature
revocation ineffective; it is likely to merely subject the offeror to
liability for the offeree's reliance loss, and in many cases, the
offeree will not have suffered any reliance loss.
B. The CISG Rule
CIGS article 16 was designed as a compromise of the disparate
approaches taken by domestic legal systems.74 It provides as
follows:
(1) Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked in the
revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an
acceptance.
(2) However, an offer cannot be revoked:
70. See KOTZ, supra note 59, at 22-23; MARSH, supra note 60, at 59-60;
NICHOLAS, supra note 68 at 64; ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 65, at 359;
Bonassies, supra note 68, at 772 n.17.
71. See NICHOLAS, supra note 68, at 63-67.
72. See Bonassies, supra note 68, at 775-76.
73. See KOTZ, supra note 59, at 22-23; NICHOLAS, supra note 68, at 64-66
(discussing two court decisions that favored a delictual remedy and observing that
there seems to be no case in which a clearly contractual remedy has been given);
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 65, at 359-60.
74. See KOTZ, supra note 59, at 24; G. E6rsi, Article 16-Revocability of Offer
in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 150, 150-54 (C.M. Bianca &
M.J. Bonell eds., 1987). For a contrary view that the CISG rule is not a
compromise between civil legal systems and common law legal systems, but
instead is based on fundamental ideas shared by both types of legal system, see
Kazuaki Sono, Restoration of the Rule of Reason in Contract Formation: Has There




(a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for
acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or
(b) if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer
as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in
reliance on the offer. 5
C Must the Offer Be in Writing?
Unlike UCC section 2-205, CISG article 16(2) does not require
that an offer be in writing in order to be firm and irrevocable.
Although it may be difficult for an offeree to prove that an
unwritten offer indicated that it was irrevocable, it is often possible.
D. What Limits Are Imposed on the Period of Irrevocability?
CISG article 16(2) also differs from the UCC firm offer rule by
not imposing any statutory limit on the period of irrevocability.
Thus an offer will be irrevocable for one year if the offer so
stipulates.
E. What Kind of Assurance of Irrevocability Is Required?
Under article 16(2), an offer will be irrevocable if its express
terms indicate irrevocability. The offeror need not use the words,
"I promise not to revoke." An assurance that "I will hold this offer
open until June 15" will make the offer irrevocable until June 15.76
It has also been suggested that words like "this is a firm offer"
unambiguously indicate irrevocability."
75. CISG art 16. Under the CISG, "revocation" of an offer is distinguished
from "withdrawal" of an offer. Under article 15(2), an offer (even one that is
irrevocable) may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the offeree before, or at
the same as, the offer. Since an offer cannot become effective until it reaches the
offeree (article 15(1)), a withdrawal complying with article 15(2) prevents the offer
from ever becoming effective. Revocation, on the other hand, is a way of
terminating an offer that has become effective.
In assuming that article 16 governs a revocability issue in our American
client's transaction, we assume that the other party's state has not made an article
92(1) declaration excluding the CISG Part II contract formation rules (the United
States has not made such a declaration). We also assume that the parties have not
somehow opted out of article 16 by way of article 6, which allows the parties to
exclude the application of the CISG altogether or exclude any of its provisions
except article 12. We also assume that the non-American party's state has not
made an article 96 declaration that, pursuant to article 12, eliminates the article 16
provision indicating that a firm offer need not be in writing in order to be effective.
(The United States has not made an article 96 declaration).
76. JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 142, at 160 (3d ed. 1999).
77. See Peter Schlechtriem, Formation of the Contract, in COMMENTARY ON
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 97, 120-21
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Problems arise from the article 16(2)(a) reference to "a fixed
time for acceptance." This is undoubtedly a reference to offer
language stating that the offer must be accepted within a specified
time or that the offer will expire at a specified time.7 ' Does such
language necessarily indicate irrevocability and thus automatically
make the offer irrevocable? An American lawyer would be
surprised by this question. She would assume that fixing a time
when the offer expires cannot, by itself, indicate that the offer is
irrevocable. But, as we have noted, civil law systems are apt to
regard the fixing of an expiration date as a sign of irrevocability.
The CISG has no official comments. But UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts article 2.4 is
identical to CISG article 16. And comment 2(a) to UNIDROIT
article 2.4 states that the "indication of a fixed time for acceptance
may, but need not necessarily, amount by itself to an implicit
indication of an irrevocable offer. The answer must be found in
each case through a proper interpretation of the terms of the
offer.. ."80 The UNIDROIT Principle and comments were
drafted by an international team of legal experts and were intended
to be an unofficial restatement of legal principles for international
commercial contracts. We can expect that many courts and
arbitrators will use the comments to UNIDROIT article 2.4 for
guidance in interpreting CISG article 16 .
The prevailing view of commentators on the CISG is similar to
the UNIDROIT comment insofar as both deny that an offer that
(Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2d ed. 1998).
78. In a sentence that obviously deals with expiration, article 18(2) provides
that an "acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent does not reach the
offeror within the time he has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable
time." CISG art. 18(2) (emphasis added).
Note, by the way, that under article 18(2) (first sentence), an acceptance does
not become effective and form a contract until the acceptance reaches the offeror.
Although the offeree's dispatch of his acceptance cuts off the offeror's power to
revoke under article 16(1), it does not yet form a contract.
79. See supra note 64, 69 and accompanying text.
80. INIDROIT PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACrS art.
2.4 cmt. 2(a) (1994) [hereinafter "UNIDROIT Principles"].
81. CISG article 7(1) provides that in interpreting the CISG, a tribunal must
have regard for the international character of the CISG and the need to promote
uniformity in its application, COSG art. 7(1). Using the UNIDROIT articles and
comments in interpreting the CISG would seem to be a good way to apply
international rules, rather than domestic rules, and thus enhance uniformity and
predictability in the legal treatment of international sales. See Alejandro M.
Garro, The Gap-filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales
Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between the Principles and the CISG, 69
TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1154, 1189, 1190 (1995).
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fixes a deadline for acceptance (an expiration date) is automatically
irrevocable. In the commentators' view, however, offer language
limiting the time for acceptance should be regarded as creating a
presumption that the offer is irrevocable during this time. The
presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the offer would
be understood as merely setting an expiration date.2
I see no justification for a presumption that tilts the evidentiary
playing field in favor of either party. Article 16(2)(a) should be
interpreted so that stating a fixed time for acceptance may indicate
irrevocability, but whether it does indicate irrevocability should
depend upon an application of CISG article 8, which determines
how the offer should be interpreted and does not support the use of
presumptions. Article 8 provides:
(1) For the purpose of this Convention statements made by
the other conduct of a party are to be interpreted
according to his intent where the other party knew or
could not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the proceeding paragraph is not applicable, statements
made by and other conduct of a party are to be
interpreted according to the understanding that a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party
would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding
a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is
to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case
including the negotiations, any practices which the parties
have established between themselves, usage and any
subsequent conduct of the parties."
Consider a hypothetical case in which the offer stipulated that
it could not be accepted after March 15. Assume that the offeree
did not ask the offeror whether her offer was irrevocable, and that
given what the offeree knew, he would not have been "aware" of
the offeror's subjective intent to make a revocable offer.'
82. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 76, § 143.1 at 163; Schlechtriem, supra note
77, at 121; Sono, supra note 74, at 479.
Honnold suggests that this rebuttable presumption is the best way to give
effect to both (1) the fact that the 1978 UNCITRAL draft (which was ultimately
adopted) rejected a Working Group draft providing that an offer cannot be
revoked if it states a fixed time of acceptance, and (2) the fact that the final version
retained a reference to "a fixed time for acceptance." See HONNOLD, supra note
76, § 143.1 at 163.
83. CISG art. 8.
84. Disputes are likely to arise when the offeror believes that her offer is
revocable and the offeree assumes that it is irrevocable. Disputes are unlikely if
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Paragraph (1) is thus inapplicable. The offer must be interpreted
under paragraph (2) and is irrevocable through March 15 if a
reasonable person in the offeree's position would understand the
language fixing a March 15 deadline for acceptance as also
indicating irrevocability. We will assume that there are no relevant
circumstances of the types listed after the word "including" in
paragraph (3). We will assume, for example, that the parties are
transacting business in an international trade that has no regularly
observed usage concerning the irrevocability implications of offer
language that fixes an expiration date.85
In applying article 8(2), the basic question is whether a
reasonable person in the offeree's circumstances would have
assumed that the offer was irrevocable and would not have
bothered to contact the offeror and ask her whether the offer was
irrevocable. In some variants of our hypothetical case, the answer
to this basic question should be affirmative, and the offer should be
declared irrevocable through March 15. If advice of counsel or the
offeree's own experience in trading with persons in the offeror's
country led the offeree to believe that the practice in the offeror's
country was to regard as irrevocable any offer that fixed a deadline
for acceptance, then the offeree could reasonably assume that the
offer he received was intended to be irrevocable.
In other variants, however, the answer to the basic question
should be negative, and the offer should be declared revocable. If
the offeree's only reason for assuming that the offeror had made an
irrevocable offer was the fact that in the offeree's country, offers
fixing a deadline for acceptance are normally regarded as irrevoc-
able, such an assumption would be unreasonable. A reasonable
person engaged in international trade would not assume that legal
and business practices in his country were reflected in the practices
of every other country. A reasonable offeree would therefore
make an inquiry as to the offeror's intention, and the cheapest and
most reliable inquiry would be one directed to the offeror herself.
The offeror's response to the reasonable offeree's inquiry would be
that the offer was revocable, and the reasonable offeree would thus
not assume that it was irrevocable.
both parties regard the offer as revocable, or both parties regard the offer as
irrevocable, or the offeror believes her offer is irrevocable and the offeree assumes
that it is revocable.
85. CISG article 9 determines when the parties are bound by a usage of trade.
Unless a usage was agreed to by the parties, it is not binding if it was not a
regularly observed usage in an international trade. See CISG art. 9.
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F. If the Offer Does Not Meet the Requirements of Article 16(2)(a),
Might It Become Irrevocable Because of the Offeree's Reliance?
Recall that under CISG article 16(2)(b), an offer is irrevocable
"if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being
irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.
8 6
Even if the words of the offer do not indicate irrevocability under
paragraph (2)(a), the offeree may be able to establish irrevocability
under paragraph (2)(b) if he has reasonably relied on an implied
promise not to revoke.
Paragraph (2)(b) looks very much like American promissory
estoppel doctrines, although it does not expressly require that the
offeree's reliance must have been foreseeable to the offeror and
does not expressly require that the offeree's reliance be detri-
mental.87  Despite these omissions, we can expect that many
tribunals will apply paragraph (2)(b) in much the same fashion as
American courts have used promissory estoppel. If the offeree's
reliance was not reasonably foreseeable to the offeror, a court
applying paragraph (2)(b) could usually find that the offeree's
reliance on the offer's being irrevocable was unreasonable.88 And
courts could easily assume that "reliance" means detrimental
reliance. To rely on a belief (for example, a belief that the offeror
will not revoke) is to act in a way that will impair one's future well-
being if the belief turns out to be false. Cases arise under
paragraph (2)(b) because an offeree's belief that the offeror would
not attempt to revoke has turned out to be false.
The critical issue under paragraph (2)(b) is whether the offeree
reasonably relies on the offer's being irrevocable. Presumably, the
offeree (1) must have had a good reason for believing that the offer
was irrevocable and (2) must also have acted reasonably in relying
on that belief (did not engage in a foolhardy form of reliance).
Both requirements will probably be met when the parties
understand that the offeree might use the offer in preparing his own
offer to a third person, as in cases where a supplier of goods makes
an offer to a general contractor who is bidding for a construction
contract.89 It has also been suggested that the reliance requirements
86. CISG art. 16(2)(b).
87. See supra text accompanying note 16.
88. The comments to UNIDROIT Principles article 2.4 suggest that the
offeree's acts of reliance do not make the offer irrevocable unless they should have
been foreseen by the offeror. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES art. 2.4 cmt. 2(b).
89. See HONNOLD, supra note 76, § 144, at 164, see also UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES art. 2.4 cmt. 2(b), illus. 4.
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will be met when the parties understood that the offeree would
have to undertake a costly investigation in order to decide whether
to accept the offer.90
It is not clear whether an offeree can satisfy the requirements
of paragraph (2)(b) when his reliance takes the form of inaction (an
omission or forbearance). The English version of paragraph (2)(b)
uses the word "acted." A court might decide that an offeree has
not acted in reliance if his only reliance was a failure to act.91 At
least one commentator, however, suggests that the word "acted"
means not only a positive act, but also a failure to act, for example,
a demonstrable failure to solicit other offers.92
III. The Proposed Revision of the UCC Firm Offer Rule
Since 1991, a drafting committee appointed by the Permanent
Editorial Board for the UCC has been working on a revised Article
2. When a final draft has been approved by both the American
Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), the new
Article 2 will be promulgated as a uniform act and presented to the
various state legislature for statutory enactment. The following
discussion is based on the. April 14, 2000 Decision Draft of the
revised Article 2.93
A. The Proposed Firm Offer Rule
In the proposed revision of Article 2, the firm offer rule has
been moved from section 2-205 to section 2-204, which provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods is an authenticated
record which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held
open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time
stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no
event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months;
90. See ALBERT H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 167-68 (1989) (quoting various authorities); see also UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES art. 2.4 cmt. 2(b).
91. The UNIDROIT comments refer to acts which the offeree must have
"performed" in reliance and provide a series of examples, all of which involve
positive actions. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES art. 2.4 cmt. 2(b).
92 See Schlechtriem, supra note 77, at 122.
93. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, [NEw] REVISED ARTICLE 2, SALES:




but any such term of assurance in a form record supplied by the
offeree must be separately authenticated by the offerer.94
B. Must the Offer Be in Writing?
The proposed firm offer rule does not require that the offer be
in "writing." The present requirement of a "signed writing" would
be replaced by the requirement of an "authenticated record." The
word "record" means "information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form."'95 To "authenticate" a record, one
must sign or otherwise use a symbol or sound with intent to adopt
or accept the terms of that record.96
Thus, the words of an offer are preserved in a "record" if they
can be seen on a computer screen or heard from a tape recording,
even if they are never reduced to tangible form.97 And this record
can be "authenticated" by the offeror through use of any visible
symbol or sound intended to indicate her adoption of the offer
terms. Nevertheless, a telephonic or other oral offer is not in an
authenticated record if it has not been recorded in some way. Thus,
a primary purpose of the original UCC firm offer rule-to exclude
oral offers-is preserved. 98 The proposed revision merely accom-
modates technological advances in recording communications.
It may be argued that the revised firm offer rule should not
even require an authenticated record, that it should apply to purely
oral offers, as CISG article 16(2) does.9  I see no compelling
objective, however, to the authenticated record requirement, so
long as the new section 2-205 makes it clear that an authenticated
94. Id. § 2-205.
95. Id. § 2-103(a)(34).
96. Id. § 2-103(a)(1). Even if the proposed firm offer rule is not enacted, a
new federal statute (effective October 1, 2000) provides that the respect to any
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, a record or signature
cannot be denied legal effect solely because it is in electronic form. See Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, §§ 101(a),
103(a)(3), 106, 114 Stat. 464, 464, 468, 472 (2000). See also Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act § 2, § 3(b)(2) and cmts. 4, 7, § 7 (2000) (containing provisions
similar to those of the federal statute).
97. The present UCC defines "writing" to include any intentional reduction to
tangible form. See U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (2000).
98. The purpose to exclude oral offers is expressed in id. § 2-205 cmt. 2.
99. See HONNOLD supra note 76 at 161 n.6 § 142, at 161 n.6 (3d ed. 1999)
(merely noting, without taking a position on the issue, that law revision bodies in
other common law countries have proposed the elimination of formal writing
requirements for firm offers).
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record containing the offeror's assurance of irrevocability is not the
exclusive way to make an offer irrevocable, and allows some means
of making a purely oral offer irrevocable.
C. What Limits Are Imposed on the Period of Irrevocability?
Note that the proposed section 2-205 preserves the present
three-month limit on the period of irrevocability. A three-month
limit on "reasonable time" (the period of irrevocability when no
period is specified in the offer) is probably justified. It enhances
the predictability of legal outcomes and is arguably consistent with
the CISG.
A three-month limit or irrevocability when the offerer specifies
a longer period is a different matter, however. It is difficult to see
why an offer that states a six-month period of irrevocability should
be treated differently than an offer stating a two-month period.
The outside limit of three-month should be eliminated in order to
respect party autonomy and makes the UCC consistent with the
GISG.
D. What Kind of Assurance of Irrevocability Is Required?
The new proposed UCC firm offer rule applies only if the offer
record "by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open."' °
This is essential the language of the present rule.
We noted above that our courts have not made it clear what
counts as an adequate "assurance. '' .°. One might therefore argue
that the revised firm offer rule should clear up some of the
confusion. The new rule could at least provide that merely fixing
an expiration date is not an adequate assurance that the offer will
be held open.
It seems preferable, however, to accept the statutory language
in the proposed revision. As offer should be interpreted as a
reasonable person in the offeree's circumstances would interpret it.
Language that would note be interpreted as an assurance of
irrevocability in one trade might be interpreted as such an
assurance in another trade. This might even be true of language
fixing an expiration date. It would therefore be unwise to revise the
firm offer rule by identifying particular language as always
inadequate or always adequate.
100. P. REV. U.C.C. § 2-205.
101. See supra Part I.E.
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E. If the Offer Does Not Meet the Requirements of Proposed
Section 2-204, Might It Become Irrevocable Because of the
Offeree's Reliance?
We noted above that it is not clear whether the present UCC
section 2-205 firm offer rule precludes courts from using promissory
estoppel to make an offer irrevocable.' °2 This is an important issue
that needs to be resolved. A small step in this direction was taken
in the comments to a previous draft of the revised Article 2:
"[Section 2-205] supplements rather than displaces other methods
by which [offers are made irrevocable], such as with consideration
or by reliance'0 3 This is a clear statement that the firm offer rule in
proposed section 2-205 does not preclude the application of
promissory estoppel to offers that fail to meet that section's formal
requirements.
Even if the comment is restored in the final version of the new
Article 2, however, it would be only a persuasive comment and not
statutory law. The comment would still leave it up to the courts of
each state to decide whether promissory estoppel can be applied.
We cannot expect the case law to be uniform from state to state.
We can expect that the case law of many states will be difficult to
research and comprehend.
It would be preferable that the statutory text of the new
section 2-205 explicitly provide that an offeror's express or implied
assurance of irrevocability makes the offer irrevocable if it is
supported by consideration or the offeree reasonably relies on it.
This is the position that a probable majority of courts would take.
If the proposed section 2-205 is promulgated by the ALI and
NCCUSL as part of a uniform act, it would not be improper for
state legislatures to enact nonuniform versions setting forth their
positions on promissory estoppel. I would hope that many
legislatures would enact provisions similar to that proposed in the
preceding paragraph. Even if some legislatures provide that offeree
reliance cannot make an offer irrevocable, that would at least be a
welcome clarification of the law in those states.
One of the purposes of the UCC is to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions." Another important purpose is to
102. See supra Part I.F.
103. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVISED ARTICLE 2, SALES: PROPOSED
FINAL DRAFT (MAY 1, 1999) § 2-204 cmt. 2 (American Law Institute 1999). In this
May 1, 1999 draft, the firm offer rule was in section 2-204, rather than 2-205. The
draft of April 14, 2000 omits the comments to its firm offer section (section 2-205).
104. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (200).
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simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions.'5  If state legislatures enact disparate nonuniform
versions of the new section 2-205, adding provisions dealing with
promissory estoppel, this obviously will not enhance uniformity, but
neither will it make the law less uniform than it would be if all
states were to enact section 2-205 in its proposed uniform version
and then go their separate ways by means of case law. The
statutory enactment of such nonuniform versions would at least
make it easier for lawyers to ascertain each state's position on
promissory estoppel in the revocation context and would thus
promote simplicity and clarity.
It may be objected that state legislatures should not attempt to
codify a promissory estoppel doctrine because this would deprive
courts of the flexibility needed in developing and applying a
doctrine that is equitable in nature. But the statutory reference to
offeree reliance need not present a detailed and inflexible
promissory estoppel doctrine with an exhaustive enumeration of all
the required elements. A nonuniform version of the new section 2-
205 could paint its position on reliance with broad strokes.
CISG article 16(2)(b) provides a good model. It expresses the
crucial requirement that the offeree's reliance be reasonable. As I
have already suggested, the CISG's failure to expressly require that
the reliance be reasonably foreseeable to the offeror and detri-
mental to the offeree is not a serious defect.' °6 If necessary, such
details can be filled in by case law. If a strong majority of states
were to incorporate the language of CISG article 16(2)(b) into
nonuniform versions of the new UCC section 2-205, this would
actually enhance legal uniformity, not only throughout the United
States, but throughout the global marketplace."'
105. See id. § 1-102(2((a).
106. See supra text accompanying.
107. In the absence of structural reasons or strong policy reasons for deviating
from the CISG, the UCC should be in harmony with the CISG. All other things
being equal, it is advantageous (for both merchants and lawyers) to have the same
rules govern domestic and international sales. See Linda J. Rusch, The Relevance
of Evolving Domestic and International Law on Contracts in the Classroom:
Assumptions About Assent, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2043, 2062 (1998) (suggesting that any
revision of UCC Article 2 that does not take into account legal developments in
the international sphere risks adopting idiosyncratic rules that will not be
serviceable under the demands of the global economy); Peter Winship,
Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U. C. C. Article 2 in Light of
the United Nations Sales Convention, 37 LoY. L. REV. 43, 47, 92 (1991) (arguing





During the next few years, the various states of the United
States will enact the revised UCC Article 2 at different times, and
the CISG will be ratified by additional counties at different times.
Many offerors negotiating contracts for sales of goods will thus face
an especially complex legal environment. Some of their offers will
be governed by the present UCC Article 2, some will be governed
by the revised Article 2, some will be governed by the CISG, and
some will be governed by the domestic law of a state or country
that has not adheared to any UCC Article 2 or to the CISG. As we
have seen, these different bodies of law contain different rules
concerning revocability.
Despite these differences, it will be possible for offerors and
their lawyers to develop standard revocability terms that can be
routinely used (with a high probability of success) in most
transactions likely to be governed by either the UCC or the CISG.
In other words, a New York offeror should be able to use the same
revocability term for Texas offerees and French offerees. The
offeror will, of course, need two different standard terms: one for
situations in which he wants his offer to be revocable, and another
for situations in which he wants his offer to be irrevocable.
A. Making the Offer Revocable
If a New York offeror wants his offer to be revocable, he
should use a standard term similar to the following:
This offer will expire at 5:00 p.m. New York time on
, 20 and cannot be accepted after that time. This is
not a firm offer, and we reserve the right to revoke it at any
time. Therefore, you should not rely on this offer until we have
formed a contract.
This first sentence established a very specific expiration time.
There are good reasons for specifying a time of expiration. First, it
avoids the uncertainty that arises when the offer states no
expiration time and is thus deemed to have a "reasonable"
duration. Second, if the market price of the goods is apt to
fluctuate rapidly, the offeror will want an early expiration date that
curtails the offeree's opportunity to speculate at the offeror's
expense (and does so automatically, without any need for offeror
revocation). '°8 Fixing an expiration date would not make the offer
108. Assume that the offeree is a buyer. If she is allowed a long time in which
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irrevocable under the present or revised UCC rule, and should not
make the offer irrevocable under CISG article 16(2)(a), because the
offer clearly indicates that it is revocable.
This is accomplished in the second sentence, which, in order to
minimize the risk of misunderstanding, says the same thing in two
different ways: "This is not a firm offer," and "we reserve the right
to revoke it at any time." Such language should make the offer
revocable even under the domestic law of a country that follows the
German approach to revocability.
The third sentence is a warning to the offeree that she should
not rely on the offer. Such a warning will tend to make any offeree
reliance unreasonable and thus help the offeror overcome an
argument based on American promissory estoppel doctrine or on
GISG article 16(2)(b).
B. Making the offer Irrevocable
If a New York offeror wants his offer to be irrevocable, he
should use a standard term similar to the following (and offerees
should be advised by their counsel to request such language):
This offer will expire at 5:00 p.m. New York time on
-_, 20 and cannot be accepted after that time. This is
a firm offer, and we assure you that we will not revoke it prior to
the above-stated time of expiration.
The first sentence is identical to the first sentence in the
standard term for revocable offers. The reasons for fixing an
expiration time in revocable offer apply to irrevocable offers as
well.
So long as the offer appears in a "signed writing," the second
sentence would make the offer irrevocable under the present UCC
section 2-205.'0 But for no more than three months! If an
American offeree requests an offer that is firm for a longer period,
the offeror could suggest an option contract with consideration.
to make up her mind, she can wait until the market price reaches a point well
above the price stipulated in the seller's offer, and then accept the offer, buy the
goods from the offeror at the offer price, and resell the goods at the new and
higher market price. If the market price does not rise but instead declines after the
offeree receives the offer, she can reject or simply ignore the offer and purchase
similar goods at the new and lower market price. Unless it is curtailed by an early
expiration date, opportunistic speculation may also be possible when the offeree is
a seller.




So long as the offer appears in an "authenticated record," the
second sentence would make the offer irrevocable (for up to three
months) under the proposed revised UCC section 2-205. (An
American Offeree who wants more than three months of
irrevocability could purchase an option contract.) So long as the
terms of the offer are provable in any way, the second sentence
would also make the offer irrevocable (throughout its duration)
under CISG article 16(2)(a).
The second sentence would make the offer irrevocable under
the domestic law of many countries, but not countries (such as the
United Kingdom) that follow the English approach to revocability
and have not yet ratified the CISG. An offeree located in such a
country should be advised to consult her own lawyer."'
In summary, the proposed standard terms could be routinely
used when an American offeror wants to make a revocable offer,
and could be routinely used for most situations in which an
American offeror wants to make an irrevocable offer to an offeree
located in the United States or some other country that has ratified
the CISG. If an American offeree requests an offer that is firm for
more than three months, however, the offeror should suggest an
option contract. And if the offeree is located in a country that has
not yet ratified the CISG, the offeror should advise her to ask her
own lawyer how the offer could be made irrevocable under the law
of her own country.
110. How would a New York offeror know whether the offeree is located in
such a country? If it is not practical for the offeror to consult his attorney on each
international transaction, the attorney could give him a (continually updated) list
of the countries that have ratified the CISG, along with effective dates. If his
offeree is located in a country in which the CISG is not yet effective, the offeror
should simply assume that the transaction might be governed by the domestic law
of the offeree's country and advise the offeree to ask her own lawyer how
irrevocability could be achieved under the law.
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